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THE "FULL FAITH AND CREDIT " CLAUSE
EDWARD S. CORWIN t
Article IV of the Constitution, sometimes called "the Federal Article",
defines in certain particulars the relations of the state entities to one another
and of the national government to the states. Its opening section reads as
follows: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public
acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Con-
gress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records
and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof." What was the
intention and what has been the operation of this provision?
I
The historical background of the above section is furnished by that
branch of private law which is variously termed "Private International Law",
"Conflict of Laws" or "Comity". This comprises a body of rules, based
largely on the writings of jurists and judicial decisions, in accordance with
which the courts of one country or "jurisdiction" will ordinarily, in the
absence of a local policy to the contrary, extend recognition and enforcement
to rights claimed by individuals by virtue of the laws or judicial decisions of
another country or "jurisdiction." 1
The nature of the problem thus dealt with is indicated in the following
passages from Story's classic work on the Conflict of Laws:
t Ph. B., igoo, LL. D., 1925, University of Michigan; Ph. D., 1905, University of Penn-
sylvania; McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, igi8, Princeton University; President of
the American Political Science Association, 1931: author of numerous works in the field
of American Constitutional law and history: including National Supremacy, The Doctrine of
Judicial Review, John Marshall and the Constitution, The Constitution and What It Means
Today.
1 STOWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1931) 246-60, contains an excellent brief discussion.
An outline of the subject is supplied in HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE (I3th ed. 1924) Ch.
XVIII, where the designation "assimilation of laws" is suggested.
(371)
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"A person sometimes contracts in one country, and is domiciled
in another, and is to pay in a third; and sometimes the property, which
is the subject of the contract, is situate in a fourth; and each of these
countries may have different, and even opposite laws, affecting the sub-
ject-matter. What then is to be done in this conflict of laws? What
law is to regulate the contract, either to determine the rights, or the
remedies, or the defenses growing out of it; or the consequences follow-
ing from it? What law is to interpret its terms, and ascertain the
nature, character, and extent of its stipulations ?" 2
And again:
"Suppose . . . a marriage celebrated in England, where marriage
is indissoluble, and a divorce obtained in Scotland, a vinculo matrimonii,
as it may be for adultery under the laws thereof, will that divorce be
operative in England, so as to authorize a new marriage there by either
party? Suppose a marriage in Massachusetts, where a divorce may be
had for adultery, will a divorce obtained in another State, for a cause
unknown to the laws of Massachusetts, be held valid there? If, in each
of these cases the divorce would be held invalid in the country, where
the marriage is celebrated, but would be held valid, where the divorce
is obtained; what rule is to govern in other countries as to such divorce?
Is it to be deemed valid, or invalid there? Will a new marriage con-
tracted there by either party be good, or be not good ?" 3
Illustrative of the solutions supplied to such questions by Comity, Con-
flict of Laws, or Private International Law-as one chooses to call it-is the
rule that a marriage which is good in the country where performed (lex loci)
is good elsewhere; ' likewise the rule that contracts are to be interpreted in
accordance with the laws of the country where entered into (lex loci
contractus) unless the parties clearly intended otherwise; 5 also the rule that
immovables may be disposed of only in accordance with the law of the coun-
try where situated (lex rei sita? 6) ; also the converse rule that chattels adhere
to the person of their owner and hence are disposable by him, even when
located elsewhere, in accordance with the law of his domicile (lex domi-
cilii 7); also the rule that regardless of where the cause arose, the courts
of any country where personal service can be got upon the defendant will
take jurisdiction of certain types of personal actions, hence termed "transi-
tory", and accord such remedy as the lex fori affords.8  Still other rules of
2 STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (5th ed. 1857) § 232. The first edition appeared in 834.
11d. §203.
'A rather extreme case is Wall v. Williamson, 8 Ala. 48 (1845).
' In certain circumstances this rule is fortified in the United States by the "obligations of
contracts" clause. See Morley v. Lake Shore Ry., 146 U. S. 162, 13 Sup. Ct. 54 (1892).
'Clark v. Graham, 6 Wheat. 577 (U. S. 1821), is an early case in which the Supreme
Court enforced this rule.
72 KENT, COM1M1uTARIES (i4th ed. 1896) *428-9. While the rule generally holds as a
rule for the inheritance of property, it is today subject to many exceptions, as a rule for
voluntary transfers.
8 Le Forest v. Tolman, 117 Mass. lO9 (1875) ; Machado v. Fontes, [i897] 2 Q. B. 231
(Eng.) are illustrative.
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first importance in the present connection determine the recognition which
the judgments of the courts of one country shall receive from those of an-
other country.
So even had the states of the Union remained in a mutual relationship
of entire independence, still private claims originating in one would often
have been assured recognition and enforcement in the others. But even the
framers of the Articles of Confederation had felt that the rules of private
international law should not be left as among the states altogether on a basis
of comity, and hence subject always to the overruling local policy of the
lez fori, but ought to be in some measure at least placed on the higher plane
of constitutional obligation.
The fourth of the Articles 9 is, indeed, the immediate source of the
provision now under consideration. The latter, however, exhibits two de-
velopments upon its predecessor: the "acts" and "records" to which it
extends full faith and credit are not confined to those of "courts and magis-
trates", and it endows Congress with power to enact supplementary and
enforcing legislation. A motion to the latter effect, which was offered on
the floor of the Convention by Gouverneur Morris, was recast in committee
to confine Congress's power to that of prescribing the manner in which "such
adts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect which judg-
ments obtained in one state shall have in another", whereupon Morris moved
to strike out the phrase here given in italics and proposed the substitution
for it of the word "thereof". Despite a warning by Johnson of Connecticut
that this would authorize the new government "to declare the effect of the
legislative acts of one state in another state" and the more general protest
of Randolph that such loose definitions of power would enable the new gov-
ernment to usurp all the state powers, the amendment was carried.10
In point of fact, these fears have to date proved largely groundless.
Congressional legislation under the "full faith and credit" clause is today
embraced in sections 905 and 906 of the Revised Statutes, which consolidate
the acts of May 26, 179o and of March 27, 18Ol.11 The former section lays
down the rules for the authentication of the legislative acts of the several
states and territories and of "any country subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States", and of the records and judicial proceedings of the same.
It then provides that "the said records and judicial proceedings authenti-
cated as aforesaid shall be given such faith and credit in every court of the
United States as they have by law and usage in the courts of the state from
whence the said records are or shall be taken". Section 9o6 lays down similar
provisions with reference to non-judicial records.
"'Full faith: and credit shall be given in each of these states to the records, acts and
judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other state."
102 FARRAND, REcORDS 488-9.
SIX STAT. 122 (790) ; 2 STAT. 298,299; 28U. S. C. A. §§ 687-8 (1928).
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Several points clearly emerge: (i) the word "effect" is construed as
referring to the effect of the records when authenticated, not to the effect
of the authentication; (2) the "faith and credit" which is required by the
rules of private international law is superseded as to "the records and judicial
proceedings" of each state by a rule of complete obligation; as to these the
local policy of the forum state can have no application. On the other hand,
(3) while the Act of 1790 lays down a rule for the authentication of the
statutes of the several states, it says nothing regarding their extraterritorial
operation; and (4) it is similarly silent regarding the common law of the
several states. The practical effect whereof to date has been, in the main, to
leave the extrastate protection of rights, except such as have ripened into a
definite judicial judgment, exactly where the Constitution found it, that is to
say, on a basis of comity, and so at the mercy of the adverse local policy of
the forum state.
In this connection it is instructive to turn to the famous case of Scott v.
Sandford.12 Said Justice Nelson, who spoke the sentiments of the Court
on this point: "No State, therefore, can enact laws to operate beyond its own
dominions. . . . Nations, from convenience and comity . . . recognise and
administer the laws of other countries. But of the nature, extent, and utility,
of them, respecting property, or the state and condition of persons within
her territories, each nation judges for itself ;" 13 and, he added that it was the
same with the states of the Union in relation to one another. It followed
that even though Dred had become a free man in consequence of his having
resided in the "free" state of Illinois, he had nevertheless upon his return
to Missouri which had the same power as Illinois to determine its local policy
respecting rights acquired extraterritorially, reverted to servitude under the
laws and judicial decisions of that state. It was upon this ground indeed that
the Court had intended originally to dispose of the case, when the slave-
holding majority of the Justices fancied they saw an opportunity for the
Court to settle the slavery question in the way they wanted it settled, by
passing upon the validity of the Missouri Compromise. And even Justices
McLean and Curtis assented to the underlying premise of the above doctrine,
the subjection of extrastate acquired rights to local policy. They merely
contended that Missouri's laws and judicial decisions did not evince the
policy toward the kind of case before the Court that the majority of the
Justices imputed to her.
Since the Civil War the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments have,
to be sure, imposed radical restrictions upon the power of the states in the
determination of the status and legal capacities of even their own inhabitants.
Furthermore, as we shall see in a later section, the Supreme Court has in
22 19 How. 393 (U. S. 1856).
2 Id. at 46o.
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recent decades handed down a series of judgments based on the "full faith
and credit" clause which attribute what is unquestionably a limited extra-
territorial operation in certain situations to state laws. But this has been
done apologetically and to the accompaniment of denials that it was being
done; and it is still undoubtedly true in the main that "no state can legislate
except with reference to its own jurisdiction." 14
Thus the clause has not abolished the general principle of the dominance
of local policy over the rules of comity. These, indeed, have always been
regarded by the Court as constituting merely a part of the local common law
of each state.15 Nor has it to date been held to require the states to open
their courts to actions in cases of personal liability, the "transitory actions"
above referred to. Such constitutional obligation as rests upon the states
in this respect comes from section 2 of Article IV or from the Fourteenth
Amendment. Neither does the section, as heretofore applied, enable state
courts to send their writs across state lines. "No sovereignty", says Story,
"can extend its process beyond its own territorial limits, to subject either
persons or property to its judicial decisions"; 10 and this principle has been
followed by the Supreme Court in its application both of the "full faith and
credit" clause and the "due process" clause of Amendment XIV.17
Article IV, section i, has had its principal and, apart from the cases
just alluded to, its sole operation in relation to jucdqments. The cases fall
into two groups: first, those in which the judgment involved was offered
as a basis of proceedings for its own enforcement outside the state where
rendered, as for example, when an action for debt is brought in the courts
of state B on a judgment for money damages rendered in state A; secondly,
those, in which the judgment involved was offered, in conformance with
the principle of res judicata, in defense in a new or "collateral" proceeding
growing out of the same facts as the original suit, as for example, when a
decree of divorce granted in state A is offered as barring a suit for divorce
by the other party to the marriage in the courts of state B.
The English courts and the different state courts in the United States,
while recognizing "foreign judgments in personam" which were reducible to
money terms as affording a basis for actions in debt, originally accorded
them generally only the status of prima facie evidence in support thereof, so
that the merits of the original controversy could always be reopened. When
offered in defense, on the other hand, "foreign judgments in personam"
14Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U. S. 592 (i88i), where it was held that a law exempting
from taxation certain bonds of the enacting state did not operate extraterritorially by virtue
of the "full faith and credit" clause. See also note 68 infra.
' Bank of Augusta v. Earle, i3 Pet. 519, 589-96 (U. S. 184o). See e. g. Kryger v. Wil-
son, 242 U. S. 171, 37 Sup. Ct. 34 (1916) ; and Bond v. Hume, 243 U. S. I5, 37 Sup. Ct.
366 (x917).
" SToRY, op. cit. supra note A § 539.
'"The leading case is Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877).
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were always ordinarily treated as conclusive, as between parties, of the issues
they purported to determine, provided they had been rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction and were not tainted with fraud. And judgments "in
rem" rendered under the same conditions were regarded as conclusive upon
everybody on the theory that, as stated by Chief Justice Marshall, "it is a
proceeding in rem to which all the world are parties." 's
II
The earliest cases to arise in which the support lent by the "full faith
and credit" clause to the above principles was invoked were actions in debt
brought on money judgments rendered in a sister state; and the question
at issue was the precise status of such a judgment in the courts of the forum
state. Was it a "foreign judgment" or a "domestic judgment" or was it
something approaching a national judgment?
The pioneer case was Mills v. Duryee,'0 decided in 1813. In an action
brought into the circuit court of the District of Columbia-the equivalent
of a state court for this purpose-on a judgment from a New York court,
the defendant endeavored to reopen the whole question of the merits of the
original case by a plea of "nil debet", his argument being that "the full faith
and credit" due the judicial records and proceedings of a state under Article
IV was only such as was due them as "evidence", and that therefore, from
the nature of evidence they were open to rebuttal. From the other side it
was answered, in the words of the Act of 1790 itself, that such records and
proceedings were entitled in each state to the same faith and credit as in the
state of origin; and that inasmuch as they were records of a court in the
state of origin, and so conclusive of the merits of the case there, they were
equally so in the forum state.
The Court adopted the latter view, saying that it had not been the inten-
tion of the Constitution merely to reenact the common law-that is, the
principles of private international law-as to the reception of foreign judg-
ments, but to amplify and fortify these. And in Hampton v. M11rcConnell 20
some years later, Chief Justice Marshall went even further, using language
which seems to show that he regarded the judgment of a state court as con-
stitutionally entitled to be accorded in the courts of sister states not simply
the faith and credit of conclusive evidence, but the validity of a final judg-
ment.
' Mankin v. Chandler, 2 Brock. 125 at i27 (C. C. D. Va. & N. C. 182.3). An English
admiralty court recognized a duty to cooperate in the enforcement of a foreign judgment as
early as 16o7, i Rolle Abr. 530; and Sir Leoline Jenkins instructed the King and Privy Council
to like effect in 1666, 2 WYNNE, LIFE OF JENKINS 762. Cf. STowELI, op. cit. supra note i,
at 252n., 25s6-7.
97 Cranch 481 (U. S. 1813). Cf. Bartlet v. Knight, i Mass. 401 (18o5).
203 Wheat. 234 (U. S. i18i).
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When, however, the next important case arose, the Court had come
under new influences. This was McElmoyle v. Cohen,21 decided in 1839, in
which the issue was whether a statute of limitations of the State of Georgia
which applied only to judgments obtained in courts other than those of
Georgia could constitutionally bar an action in Georgia on a judgment ren-
dered by a court of record of South Carolina. On the one hand, it was con-
tended, on the strength of the above cases that the "judgment of a state court
carries with it into every state all its original attributes and incidents ;" that
"it goes forth armed with the powers of the court that pronounced it, and
clothed with the authority of the laws under which it was pronounced".
But it was answered on the other hand, that the Constitution was not in-
tended "materially to interfere with the essential attributes of the lex fori";
that the Act of Congress only established a rule of evidence, of conclusive
evidence to be sure, but still of evidence only; and that it was necessary, in
order to carry into effect in a state the judgment of a court of a sister state,
to institute a fresh action in the court of the former, in strict compliance with
its laws; and that consequently, when remedies were sought in support of
the rights accruing in another jurisdiction, they were governed by the lex fori.
The Court adopted the latter position, declining to follow Marshall's
lead in Hampton v. McConnel. 22  The result is that even nowadays it is
sometimes confronted with the contention that a state need not provide a
forum for some particular type of judgment from a sister state, a claim
which it has by no means met with clear-cut principles. Thus in one case
it held that a New York statute forbidding foreign corporations doing a
domestic business to sue on causes originating outside the state was con-
stitutionally applicable to prevent such a corporation from suing on a judg-
ment obtained in a sister state.23  But in a later case it ruled that a Missis-
sippi statute forbidding contracts in cotton futures could not validly close
the courts of the state to an action on a judgment obtained in a sister state
on such a contract, although the contract in question had been entered into
in the forum state and between its citizens.2 4  Subsequent cases follow the
later rather than the earlier precedent.25  Nor is there any apparent reason
= 13 Pet. 312 (U. S. 1839).
The result is undoubtedly harmonious with common law principles by which a judg-
ment can only be executed in the jurisdiction where rendered, so that if enforcement of it in
another jurisdiction is desired, a fresh action must be brought on it. In civil law countries,
on the other hand, a foreign judgment, either after examination into its merits or without
such examination, is executed directly as if it were in all respects a domestic judgment.
Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., i9i U. S. 373, 24 Sup. Ct. 92
(1903).
I Fauntleroy v. Lum, 2IO P. S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641 (i9o8). Justice Holmes, who spoke
for the Court in both cases, asserted in his opinion in the latter that the New York statute
was "directed to jurisdiction", the Mississippi statute to "merits", but four Justices could not
grasp the distinction.
'Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 2.52 U. S. 411, 40 Sup. Ct. 371 (192o), and cases there
cited. Holmes again spoke for the Court. See also Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 42I, 434.
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why Congress, acting on the implications of Marshall's word in Hampton v.
McConnell, should not clothe extrastate judgments of any particular type
with the full status of domestic judgments of the same type in the several
states.
2 6
III
The second great class of cases to arise under the "full faith and credit"
clause embraces those raising the question whether a judgment for which
extrastate operation was being sought, either as the basis of an action or as
a defense in one, had been rendered with jurisdiction. The question occurs
both in relation to judgments in rem against property or a status alleged not
to have been within the jurisdiction of the court which handed down the
original decree, and also in connection with judgments in personam against
a non-resident defendant or defendants upon whom it is alleged personal
service was not obtained in the state of the origin of the judgment.27 We
shall consider the latter type first.
The pioneer case is that of D'Arcy v. Ketchum,28 decided in 185o. The
question presented was whether a judgment rendered by a New York court
under a statute which provided that, when joint debtors were sued and one
of them was brought into court on a process, a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff would entitle him to execute against all, must be accorded full faith
and credit in Louisiana when offered as the basis of an action in debt against
a resident of that state who had not been served by process in the New York
action.
Pressed with the argument that by "the immutable principles of justice"
no man's rights should be impaired without his being given an opportunity
to defend them, the Court ruled that, interpreted in the light of the principles
of "international law and comity" as they existed in 1790, the Act of Con-
gress of that year did not reach the case. The truth is that the decision
virtually amended the Act, for had the Louisiana defendant ventured to New
York, he could, as the Constitution of the United States then stood, have been
subjected to the judgment to the same extent as the New York defendant
who had been personally served. The subsequent disappearance, or at least
reduction, of this disparity between the operation of a personal judgment in
the home state and a sister state is to be attributed to the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus in Pennoyer v. Neff, 29 decided in 1877, and so under the Amend-
ment, the Court held that a judgment given in a case in which the state court
' Thus why should not a judgment for alimony be made directly enforcible in sister
states instead of merely furnishing the basis of an action in debt? See Thompson v. Thomp-
son, 226 U. S. 551, 33 Sup. Ct. 129 (1913).
On the general subject see Cooper v. Reynolds, IO Wall. 3o8 (U. S. 187o).81I How. 165 (U. S. i85o).
'Note 17, supra.
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had endeavored to acquire jurisdiction of a non-resident defendant by an
attachment upon property of his within the state and "constructive notice"
to him, had not been rendered with jurisdiction and hence could not afford
the basis of an action in the court of another state against such defendant,
although it bound him so far as the property attached was concerned, on
account of the inherent right of a state to assist its own citizens in obtaining
satisfaction of their just claims. Nor would such a judgment, the Court
further indicated, be due process of law in the state where rendered to any
greater extent. In the words of a recent case, "An ordinary personal judg-
ment for money, invalid for want of service amounting to due process of
law, is as ineffective in the State as outside of it." 30
Meantime, in 1855 the court had decided Lafayette Insurance Co. v.
French et al.,3' a pioneer case in its general class. Here it was held that
"where a corporation chartered by the state of Indiana was allowed by a law
of Ohio to transact business in the latter state upon the condition that service
of process upon the agent of the corporation should be considered as service
upon the corporation itself, a judgment obtained against the corporation by
means of such process" ought to receive in Indiana the same faith and credit
as it was entitled to in Ohio.
3 2
Later cases establish under both the Fourteenth Amendment and Article
IV, section I, that the cause of action must have arisen within the state
obtaining service in this way,33 that service on an officer of a corporation,
not its resident agent and not present in the state in an official capacity, will
not confer jurisdiction over the corporation; 34 that the question whether the
corporation was actually "doing business" in the state may be raised.35  On
the other hand, the fact that the business was interstate is no objection. 6
' McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90 at 92, 37 Sup. Ct. 343 at 344 (1917). See also Old
Wayne Mutual Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 27 Sup. Ct. 236 (1907) ; Wetmore v.
Karrick, 205 U. S. 141, 27 Sup. Ct. 434 (19o7). The claim that a judgment was "non-
responsive to the pleadings" raises the jurisdictional question (Reynolda v. Stockton, 140 U.
S. 254, I Sup. Ct. 773 (g89i)) ; but the fact that a non-resident defendant was only tempo-
rarily in the state when he was served in the original action does not vitiate the judgment
rendered as the basis of an action in his home state. (Renaud v. Abbott, 116 U. S. 277, 6
Sup. Ct. 1194 (1886) ; Jaster v. Currie, 198 U. S. 144, 25 Sup. Ct. 614 (19o5).) Inasmuch
as the principle of res judicato applies only to proceedings between the same parties and
privies, the plea by defendant in an action based on a judgment that he was no party or privy
to the original action raises the question of jurisdiction; and while a judgment against a cor-
poration in one state may validly bind a stockholder in another state to the extent of the par
value of his holdings (Hancock National Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S. 640, 20 Sup. Ct. 506
(I9OO)), an administrator acting under grant of administration in one state stands in no sort
of relation of privity to an administrator of the same estate in another state (Stacy v.
Thrasher, 6 How. 44, 58 (U. S. 1848) ; Brown v. Fletcher, 210 U. S. 82, 28 Sup. Ct. 702
118 Howv. 404 (U.'S. 1855).
To the same effect is Connecticut Mut. Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, ig Sup. Ct.
308 (18g9).
'Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U. S. 115, 35 Sup. Ct. 255 (1915).
" Goldev v. Morning News, I56 U. S. 518, 15 Sup. Ct. 559 (1895) ; Riverside Mills v.
Menefee, 237 U. S. 189, 35 Sup. Ct. 579 (915).
'" International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 34 Sup. Ct. 944 (1914) ; River-
side Mills v. Menefee, supra note 34.
"International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky. supra note 35.
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Still more recently, by analogy to the above cases, it has been held that
a state may require non-resident owners of motor vehicles to designate an
official within the state as an agent upon whom process may be served in any
legal proceedings growing out of their operation of a motor vehicle within
the state; 3 7 and while these cases arose under the Fourteenth Amendment
alone, unquestionably a judgment validly obtained upon this species of
service could be enforced upon the owner of a car through the courts of his
home state.
IV
In sustaining the challenge to jurisdiction in cases involving judgments
"in personam" the court was in the main making only a somewhat more
extended application of recognized principles. In order to sustain the same
kind of challenge in cases involving judgments "in reml" it has had to make
law outright. The leading case is Thompson v. Whitman,28 decided in
1873. Thompson, sheriff of Monmouth County, New Jersey, acting under
a New Jersey statute, had seized a sloop belonging to Whitman, and by a
proceeding in rem had obtained its condemnation and forfeiture in a local
court. Later, Whitman, a citizen of New York, brought an action for trespass
against Thompson in the United States circuit court for the Southern District
of New York, and Thompson answered by producing a record of the pro-
ceedings before the New Jersey tribunal. Whitman thereupon set up the
contention that the New Jersey court had acted without jurisdiction inas-
much as the sloop which was the subject matter of the proceedings had been
seized outside the county to which, by the statute under which it had acted,
its jurisdiction was confined.
As previously explained, the plea of lack of privity cannot be set up in
defense in a sister state against a judgment in rem. It is, on the other hand,
required of a proceeding in ren that the res be within the court's jurisdiction,
which was the point denied in Thompson v. Whitman. Yet could the Court
consider this challenge with respect to a judgment which was offered not
as the basis for an action for enforcement through the courts of a sister
state, but merely as a defense in a collateral action? As the law stood in
1873, it most clearly could not."9
All difficulties, nevertheless, to its consideration of the challenge to
jurisdiction in the case were brushed aside by the Court in a single sweeping
gesture. Whenever, it said, the record of a judgment rendered in a state
court is offered "in evidence" by either of the parties to an action in another
'Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 16o, 37 Sup. Ct. 30 (1916) ; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.
S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632 (1927).
Si8 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1973).
'See i BLACiK, JUDGMENTS (189I) §246.
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state, it may be contradicted as to the facts necessary to sustain the former
court's jurisdiction; "and if it be shown that such facts did not exist, the
record will be a nullity, notwithstanding the claim that they did exist."
In other words, the challenge to jurisdiction is treated as equivalent to
the plea nul tiel record, a plea which was recognized even in Mills v. Duryee
as always available against an attempted invocation of the "full faith and
credit" clause. What is not pointed out by the Court, is that it was also
assumed in the earlier case that such a plea could always be rebutted by pro-
ducing a transcript, properly authenticated in accordance with the Act of
Congress, of the judgment in the original case. The decision in Thompson
v. Whitman boils down to the proposition that it may be asserted that there
is no record where palpably there is one. Nor does it help to say that the
trial court had no jurisdiction to produce the record, for the very point at
issue was whether this question could be raised.
This, however, is only the beginning of the Court's law-making in cases
in rein. The most important class of such cases arising under Article IV,
section i, is that in which the respondent to a suit for divorce offers in defense
an earlier decree from the courts of a sister state. By the almost universally
accepted view prior to 19o6 a proceeding in divorce was one against the
marriage status and might be validly brought by either party in any state
where he or she was bona fide domiciled. 40  But in the year named, the
Court, under the leadership of the ever ingenious Justice White, discovered
by a vote of five to four, a situation in which a divorce proceeding is one in.
personain.
The case referred to is Haddock v. Haddock,4 while the earlier rule
is illustrated by Atherton v. Atherton, decided five years previously. A
comparison of the two cases is indeed striking. In the latter it was held, in
the former denied, that a divorce granted a husband without personal service
upon the wife, who at the time was residing in another state, was entitled
to recognition under the "full faith and credit" clause and the acts of Con-
gress; the difference between the cases consisting solely in the fact that
in the Atherton case the husband had driven the wife from their joint home
by his conduct, while in the Haddock case he had deserted her. The court
which granted the divorce in Atherton v. Atherton was held to have had
jurisdiction of the marriage status, with the result that the proceeding was
one in rem and hence required only service by publication upon the respond-
ent. Haddock's suit on the contrary, was held to be as to the wife in per-
"'Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. '55, 21 Sup. Ct. 544 (190); 2 COOurv, CONSTITU-
TIOxAL LImtTATIoNs (8th ed. 1927) 848; Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. io8 (U. S. 1869); Dit-
son v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87 (856) ; Dunham v. Dunham, 162 Ill. 589, 44 N. E. 841 (1896). "In
divorce cases, no more than in any other, can the court make a decree for the payment of
money by a defendant not served with process, and not appearing in the case, which shall be
binding upon him personally." 2 COOLEY, op. cit. supra at 858. See also note 49 infra.
' 2oi U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 52.5 (ixo6). See also Thompson v. Thompson, supra note 26,
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sonam, and so to require personal service upon her, or her voluntary appear-
ance, neither of which had been had; although, notwithstanding this, the
decree in the latter case was held to be valid as to the state where obtained
on account of the state's inherent power to determine the statws of its own
citizens. The upshot was a situation in which a man and a woman, when both
were in Connecticut, were divorced; when both were in New York, were
married; and when the one was in Connecticut and the other in New York,
the former was divorced and the latter married.
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The practical difficulties and distresses likely to result from such anoma-
lies were pointed out by critics of the decision at the time.4 3  In point of fact,
they have been largely avoided, because most of the state courts have con-
tinued to give judicial recognition and full faith and credit to one another's
divorce proceedings on the basis of the older idea that a divorce proceeding
is one in rein, and that if the applicant is bona fide domiciled in the state the
court has jurisdiction in this respect.
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The Haddock case is another of these instances in which the Court-or
a narrow majority of it-permitted itself to be overpersuaded that it owed
society a duty superior to logic, respect for precedent, or even common sense.
This is revealed by Justice White's expression of concern lest, if the implica-
tions of the Atherton case were to be followed, "the States whose laws were
the most lax" in the matter of causes for divorce and in residence and pro-
cedural requirements, "would in ecect dominate all the other States." 45 In
point of fact, the obstacle set up in the Haddock case to easy divorce is a
ridiculously feeble one. On the one hand, it does not and could not prevent
applicants from flocking to states with lax laws and respondents from put-
ting in necessary appearances to validate the proceedings; on the other
hand, the vast majority of divorces are granted by courts within whose
jurisdictions both parties reside, and to such instances the Haddock case
again has no application.
Furthermore, while a divorce granted to one not bona fide domiciled
within a state is, as already indicated, granted without jurisdiction, and
hence not entitled to extrastate recognition under the "full faith and credit"
'The Court had said in Atherton v. Atherton, supra note 40, at 162, 21 Sup. Ct. at 547:
"A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law." In Dun-
ham v. Dunham, supra note 40, at 6o6, 44 N. E. at 847, Judge Carter of the Illinois Supreme
Court bad characterized in anticipation, as it were, the doctrine of Haddock v. Haddock by
the remark that "It would seem to be as logical to say that one of the Siamese twins might
have been severed from the other without that other being severed from the one."
"See especially Beale, Constitutional Protection of Decrees for Divorce (igo6) 19 HARv.
L. REV. 586. In an article published twenty years later, however, Beale, Haddock Revisited
(1926) 39 HARV. L. REV. 417, Professor Beale retracts much of his earlier criticism.
" See Note (19o3) 59 L. R. A. 135, 162 and 167; (igog) 18 id. (N. s.), 647, 649. No
constitutional question is, of course, raised when a state gives full faith and credit to a
divorce granted in another state, whether this was constitutionally required or not.
'Haddock v. Haddock, supra note 41, at 574, 26 Sup. Ct. at 529.
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clause,46 not the slightest disposition has appeared within recent years to
challenge judicially the power of the states to determine what shall constitute
domicile for divorce purposes. Thus in March, 1931, Nevada, in an effort,
as we learn, "to retain for Reno its position as the nation's divorce capital
against competition from Hot Springs, Arkansas, and Boise, Idaho," enacted
a law requiring only six weeks residence by an applicant for divorce in the
courts of that state.47 But why six weeks? Why not six days, or six hours?
Haddock v. Haddock or not, suit for divorce seems to have become for those
who can pay the transportation charges little more than an ex parte pro-
ceeding.
V
Some other aspects of judgments may be dealt with more briefly. Many
of the cases involve decrees of courts of probate respecting the distribution
of estates. In order that a court have jurisdiction of such a proceeding, the
decedent must have been domiciled in the state, and the question whether he
was so domiciled at the time of his death may be raised in the court of a
sister state.48 What is more important, however, is that the res in such a pro-
ceeding, that is, the estate, must, in order to entitle the judgment recognition
under Article IV, section i, have been located in the state or legally attached
to the person of the decedent. Such a judgment is accordingly valid, gener-
ally speaking, to distribute the intangible property of the decedent, though
the evidences thereof were actually located elsewhere. 49 This is not so, on
the other hand, as to tangibles and realty. In order that the judgment of a
probate court distributing these be entitled to recognition under the Con-
stitution, they must have been located in the state; as to tangibles and realty
outside the state, the decree of the probate court is entirely at the mercy of
the lex rei sitae. 10
That a statute legitimizing children born out of wedlock does not entitle
them by the aid of the "full faith and credit" clause to share in the property
located in another state is not surprising, in view of the principle that stat-
utes do not have extraterritorial operation."' For the same reason adoption
proceedings in one state are not denied full faith and credit by the law of a
"Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14, 23 Sup. Ct. 237 (19o3). See also German Savings
Society v. Dormitzer, 192 U. S. 125, 24 Sup. Ct. 221 (1904).
'See New York Times, Mar. I7, I93l. During the first six weeks of the new dispen-
sation 513 cases were filed and 331 decrees granted. Id. May 31, i93i.
IsTilt v. Kelsey, 2W U. S. 43, 28 Sup. Ct. I (igo7) ; Burbank v. Ernst, 232 U. S. i62,
34 Sup. Ct. 299 (914). "
"Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1, 48 Sup. Ct. 410 (1928).
r' Kerr v. Devisees of Moon, 9 Wheat. 565 (U. S. 1824) ; McCormick v. Sullivant, io
Wheat. 192 (U. S. 1825) ; Robertson et al. v. Pickrell et al., iog U. S. 6o8, 3 Sup. Ct. 407
(1883) ; Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U. S. 186, 20 Sup. Ct. 873 (igoo). The controlling principle
of these cases is not confined to proceedings in probate. A court of equity "not having juris-
diction of the res, cannot affect it by its decree, nor by a deed made by a master in accord-
ance with the decree." Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S. I at 11, 30 Sup. Ct. 3 at 7 (I9o9).
u Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U. S. 386, 30 Sup. Ct. 292 (1910).
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sister state which excludes children adopted by proceedings in other states
from the right to inherit land therein. 52
A proceeding which combines some of the elements of both an in rem
and an in personam action is the proceeding in garnishment cases. Suppose
that A owes B and B owes C, and that the two former live in a different state
than C. A while on a brief visit to C's state is presented with a writ attaching
his debt to B and also a summons to appear in court on a named day. The
result of the proceedings thus instituted is that a judgment is entered in C's
favor against A to the amount of his indebtedness to B. Subsequently he
is sued by B in their home state, and offers the judgment, which he has in
the meantime paid, in defense. It was argued in behalf of B that A's debt
to him had a situs in their home state, and furthermore that C could not have
sued B in this same state without formally acquiring a domicile there. Both
propositions were however rejected by the Court, which held that the judg-
ment in the garnishment proceedings was entitled to full faith and credit
as against C's action."
Are there other challenges than the jurisdictional one to the recognition
of a judgment outside the state where rendered? There are dicta to the
effect that judgments for which extraterritorial operation is demanded under
Article IV, section i, and acts of Congress are "impeachable for manifest
fraud", but unless the fraud affected the jurisdiction of the Court the vast
weight of authority is against the proposition!" And it is universally agreed
that a judgment may not be impeached for alleged error or irregularity; 55
or as contrary to the public policy of the state where recognition is sought for
it under the "full faith and credit" clause; although as we have seen, there
are cases in which the Court has in fact permitted local policy to determine
the merits of a judgment under the pretext of regulating jurisdiction.
Finally, the clause has been interpreted in the light of the "incontrovert-
ible maxim" that "the courts of no country execute the penal laws of
"Hood v. McGehee, 237 U. S. 6ii, 35 Sup. Ct. 718 (1915).
'Harris v. B3alk, 198 U. S. 215, 25 Sup. Ct. 625 (i9o5). See also Chicago, R. I. & Pac.
Ry. v. Sturm, 174 U. S. 710, 19 Sup. Ct. 797 (1899).
" Christmas v. Russell, s Wall. 290 (U. S. I866) ; Maxwell v. Stewart, 21 Vall. 71 (U.
S. 1874) ; Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U. S. 1, 6 Sup. Ct. 242 (1885) ; Wisconsin v. Pelican
Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 8 Sup. Ct. 1370 (1888) ; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup.
Ct. 269 (89o); Simmons v. Saul, 138 U. S. 439, 11 Sup. Ct. 369 (I8gI) ; American Exp.
Co. v. Mullins, 212 U. S. 311, 29 Sup. Ct. 381 (199o). In Cole v. Cunningham, the Court
sustained the Massachusetts court in enjoining, in connection with insolvency proceedings
instituted in that state, a Massachusetts creditor from continuing in New York courts an
action which had been commenced there before the insolvency suit was brought. This was
done on the theory that a party within the jurisdiction of a court may be restrained from
doing something in another jurisdiction opposed to principles of equity, it having been shown
that the creditor was aware of the debtor's embarrassed condition when the New York action
was instituted. The injunction unquestionably denied "full faith and credit" to the New
York proceedings, the jurisdiction of the New York courts being unquestioned. The decision
commanded the assent of only five Justices, and must be reckoned another of the numerous
instances of the Court's attempting the role of special providence under this clause.
'Cases just cited, supra note 54.
' Notes 23 and 24 supra.
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another." 57 In the leading case of Huntington v. Attrill,58 however, the
Court so narrowly defined "penal" in this connection as to make it substan-
tially synonymous with "criminal", and on this basis held a judgment which
had been recovered under a state statute making the officers of a corporation
who signed and recorded a false certificate of the amount of its capital stock
liable for all of its debts, to be entitled under Article IV, section I, to recog-
nition and enforcement in the courts of sister states. And a recent case 59
suggests the possibility that a judgment for taxes might be sued upon in the
name of the taxing state in the courts of sister states.60
VI
The most significant cases arising under the "full faith and credit"
clause within recent years have been those, referred to in the opening section
of this paper, in which the Court has invoked the clause in order to give
statutes extrastate operation in certain situations. The initial effort in this
direction was made in connection with transitory actions based on statute.
Earlier, such actions had rested upon the common law, which was fairly uni-
form throughout the states, so that there was usually little discrepancy
between the law under which the plaintiff from another jurisdiction claimed
his action (lex loci) and the law under which the defendant responded (lex
fori). In the late seventies, however, the states, abandoning the common
law rule on the subject, began passing laws which authorized the representa-
tives of a decedent whose death had resulted from injury to bring an action
for damages. 61 The question at once presented itself whether, if such an
action was brought in a state other than that in which the injury occurred, it
was governed by the statute under which it arose or by the law of the forum
state, which might be less favorable to the defendant. Nor was it long before
the same question presented itself with respect to transitory actions e.x con-
tractu, where the contract involved had been made under laws peculiar to the
state where made, and with those laws in view.
' Chief Justice Marshall, in The Antelope, Io Wheat. 66, 123 (1825) ; see also Wiscon-
sin v. Pelican Ins. Co.. supra note 54. The importance of the maxim is chiefly felt in con-
nection with the question of what causes of actions originating in sister states the courts of
a state shall treat as transitory, and so furnish a forunh for them. See Leflar, Extrastate
Enforccment of Penal and Governmental Claims (1932) 46 HAR,. L. REy. 193-225.
0' 146 U. S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224 (1892); Dennick v. R. R., 103 U. S. II (88o) had
paved the way for the later case.
'Moore v. Mitchell; 281 U. S. 18, 5o Sup. Ct. 175 (193o).
C In Am. Exp. Co. v. Mullins, supra note 54, it was held that a summary judgment
whereby property was seized and destroyed as contraband in one state must be recognized
when offered in defense in a suit brought in the courts of another state for the value of the
property. Clearly this result cannot rest on the principle of res judicata. Perhaps the case
should be classified with those dealt with in the next section.
a' Dennick v. R. R., supra note 58, was the first of the so-called "Death Act" cases to
reach the Supreme Court. See also Stewart v. B. & 0. R. R., 168 U. S. 445, 18 Sup. Ct. io5
(1897).
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In Chicago and Alton R. R. v. Wiggins, 2 decided in 1887, the Court,
confronted with the latter form of the question, indicated its clear opinion
that in such situations it was the law under which the contract was made, not
the law of the forum state, which should govern. Its utterance on the point
was, however, not merely obiter; it was based on an error of the most pal-
pable nature, namely, the false supposition that the Constitution gives "acts"
the same extraterritorial operation as the Act of 179o does "judicial records
and proceedings". Notwithstanding which, this dictum is today the basis of
"the settled rule" that the defendant in a transitory action is entitled to all the
benefits resulting from whatever material restrictions the statute under which
plaintiff's right of action originated sets thereto, except that courts of sister
states cannot be thus prevented from taking jurisdiction in such cases.
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Nor is it alone to defendants in transitory actions that the "full faith
and credit" clause is today a shield and a buckler. Some legal relationships
are so complex, the Court holds, that the law under which they were formed
ought always to govern them as long as they persist.6 4 One such relationship
is that of a stockholder and his corporation. Hence, notwithstanding the
principle that no state need admit a "foreign" corporation to do local business
except on such terms as it chooses to lay down, yet if it does so and a ques-
tion later arises as to the liability of the stockholders of the corporation, the
courts of the state are required by the "full faith and credit" clause to deter-
mine the question in accordance with the constitution, laws and judicial
decisions of the corporation's home state."
And the same principle applies to the relationship which is formed when
one takes out a policy in an insurance company. Thus in Royal Arcanum v.
Green,66 in which a fraternal insurance association chartered under the laws
of Massachusetts was being sued in the courts of New York by a citizen of
the latter state on a contract of insurance made in that state, the Court held
that the defendant company was entitled under the "full faith and credit"
clause to have the case determined in accordance with the laws of Massachu-
setts and its own constitution and by-laws as these had been construed by
the Massachusetts courts.
C2zg U. S. 615, 7 Sup. Ct. 398 (1887).
'Glenn v. Garth, 147 U. S. 36o, 13 Sup. Ct. 350 (1893) ; Northern Pac. R. R. v. Bab-
cock, 154 U. S. I9O, 14 Sup. Ct. 978 (1894); Slater v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Sowers,
213 U. S. 55, 67, 28 Sup. Ct. 397, 401 (1908) ; Tennessee Coal Co. v. George, 233 U. S. 354,
34 Sup. Ct. 587 (914). A state court does not violate the "full faith and credit" clause by
mere error in construing the law upon which a transitory action from another state de-
pends, Glenn v. Garth, supra; Banholzer v4 N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 178 U. S. 4o2, 20 Sup.
Ct. 972 (19oo).
See Holmes, in Modem Woodman of Am. v. Mixer, 267 U. S. 544, 551, 45 Sup. Ct.
389 (1925).
' Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243, 32 Sup. Ct. 415 (1912) ; Selig v. Hamilton, 234
U. S. 652, 34 Sup. Ct. 926 (1914).
W 237 U. S. 531, 35 Sup. Ct. 724 (1915) ; followed in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266
U. S. 389, 45 Sup. Ct. 129 (1924); Modern Woodmen of Am. v. Mixer, supra note 64.
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Finally, by a recent case the relationship of employer and employee, so
far as the obligations of the one and the rights of the other under a work-
men's compensation act are concerned, is similarly classified. 7 The cause
of action in the case was an injury in New Hampshire, resulting in death,
to a workman who had entered the defendant company's employment in Ver-
mont, the home state of both parties. The Court held that the case was
governed under the "full faith and credit" clause by the Vermont workmen's
compensation act, not that of New Hampshire. The relationship, it said,
"was created by the law of Vermont, and so long as that relationship per-
sisted its incidents were properly subject to regulation there." 68
Thus the Court from according an extrastate operation to statutes
and judicial decisions in favor of defendants in transitory actions, proceeded
next to confer the same protection upon certain classes of defendants in local
actions in which the plaintiff's claim was the outgrowth of a relationship
formed extraterritorially. But can the Court stop at this point? If it is
true, as Chief Justice Marshall once remarked, that "the Constitution was
not made for the benefit of plaintiffs alone", so also it is true that it was not
made for the benefit of defendants alone. The day may come when the
Court will approach the question of the relation of the "full faith and credit"
clause to the extrastate operation of laws from the same angle as it today
views the broader question of the scope of state legislative power. When
and if this day arrives, state statutes and judicial decisions will be given such
extraterritorial operation as seems reasonable to the Court to give them.
In short, the rule of the dominance of local policy of the forum state will be
superseded by that of judicial review.69
VII
The question arises whether the application to date, not by the Court
alone but by Congress and the Court, of Article IV, section i, can be said
to have met the expectations of its framers. In the light furnished by the
account given in an earlier paragraph of the framing of the clause this may
17Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 52 Sup. Ct. 571 (1932).
"Id. at 158. The Court had earlier remarked that "Workmen's Compensation legisla-
tion rests upon the idea of status, not upon that of implied contract". Cudahy Packing Co.
v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418 at 423, 44 Sup. Ct. 153 at 154 (923). In contrast to the above
cases, see Kryger v. Wilson, supra note 15. Where it was held that the question whether the
cancellation of a land contract was governed by the lex rei sitae or the lex locus contractus
was purely a question of local common law; also Bond v. Hume, supra note 15, where the
general principle of the 'dominance of local policy over the rules of comity is set forth at
length by Chief Justice White, only to be ignored in the decision of the case.
Reviewing some of the cases treated in this section, a writer in 1925 said: "It appears,
then, that the Supreme Court has quite definitely committed itself to the program of mak-
ing itself, to some extent, a tribunal for bringing about uniformity in the field of conflicts
a,. . although the precise circumstances under which it will regard itself as having juris-
diction for this purpose are far from clear." E. M. Dodd, The Power of the Supreme
Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws (1926) 39 HARv. L. REv.
533-562. It can hardly be said that the law has been subsequently clarified on this point.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
be seriously doubted. The protest was raised against the clause, it will be
recalled, that in vesting Congress with power to declare the effect state laws
should have outside the enacting state, it enabled the new government to
usurp the powers of the states; but the objection went unheeded.
The main concern of the Convention, it may be admitted, was to render
the judgments of the state courts in civil cases effective throughout the
Union. Yet even this objective has been by no means completely realized,
owing to the doctrine of the Court that before a judgment of a state court
ran be enforced in a sister state, a new suit must be brought on it in the
courts of the latter; and the further doctrine that with respect to such a suit,
the judgment sued on is only "evidence"; the logical deduction from which
proposition is that the sister state is under no constitutional compulsion to
give it a forum.
These doctrines were first clearly stated in the McEhn oyle case and
flowed directly from the new states' rights premises of the Court; but they are
no longer in harmony with the prevailing spirit of constitutional construction
nor with the needs of the times. Also, the clause seems always to have been
interpreted on the basis of the assumption that the term "judicial proceed-
ings" refers only to final judgments and does not include intermediate proc-
esses and writs; but the assumption would seem to be groundless, and if it
is. then Congress has the power under the clause to provide for the service
and execution throughout the United States of the judicial processes of the
several states.
Under the present system, suit has ordinarily to be brought where the
defendant, the alleged wrongdoer resides, which means generally where no
part of the transaction giving rise to the action took place. What could be
more irrational? "Granted that no state can of its own volition make its
process run beyond its borders . . . is it unreasonable that the United States
should by federal action be made a unit in the manner suggested?" 70
Indeed, there are few clauses of the Constitution, the merely literal
possibilities of which have been so little developed as the "full faith and
credit" clause. Congress has the power under the clause to decree the effect
that the statutes of one state shall have in other states. This being so, it does
not seem extravagant to argue that Congress may under the clause describe
a certain type of divorce and say that it shall be granted recognition through-
out the Union, and that no other kind shall. Or to speak in more general
terms, Congress has under the clause power to enact standards whereby uni-
formity of state legislation may be secured as to almost any matter in con-
nection with which interstate recognition of private rights would be useful
and valuable. 71
o Cook, supra note 25, at 43o. The entire article is important; see also the Australian
Service and Execution of Process Act, given in an appendix to it, at 441-).
UI ScHoFiELD, ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND EQUITY (1921) 211 et seq.
THE "FULL FAITH AND CREDIT" CLAUSE
Nor should the limited initiative taken by the Court in this matter in
recent years deter Congress from action. The little that can be accomplished
by "the judicial process of inclusion and exclusion" will go neither far nor
fast toward meeting present-day necessities. Besides it is to Colkqress that
the Constitution itself reserves the initiative in the application of the "full
faith and credit" clause, not to the Court.
As was seen earlier, the legislation of Congress comprised in sections
905 and 906 of the Revised Statutes lays down a rule not merely for the
recognition of the records and judicial proceedings of state courts in the
courts of sister states, but for their recognition in "every court of the United
States", and it further lays down a like rule for the records and proceedings
of the courts "of any territory or any country subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States."
These features of the acts of Congress are to be referred not to Article
IV, section i, but to Congress's power under the "necessary and proper"
clause in relation to Article III, and to its powers in connection with the
government of the territories and of the District of Columbia.72  Doubtless,
Congress might also by virtue of its powers in the field of foreign relations
lay down a mandatory rule regarding recognition of foreign judgments in
eirery court of the United States. At present, the duty to recognize such
judgments even in the national courts rests only on comity and is qualified,
in the judgment of the Supreme Court by a strict rule of reciprocity.73
"Embry v. Palmer, 1o U. S. 3, 2 Sup. Ct. 25 (1882); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v.
Sowers, .supra note 63.
'Hilton v. Guyot, i.59 U. S. 113, x6 Sup. Ct. 139 (1895), where a French judgment
offered in defense was held not a bar to the suit. Four Justices dissented on the ground that
"the application of the doctrine of res judicala does not rest in discretion; and it is for the
government, and not for its courts, to adopt the principle of retorsion, if deemed under any
circumstances desirable or necessary." Id. at 234, 6 Sup. Ct. at 171. At the same sitting
of court, an action in a United States circuit court on a Canadian judgment was sustained on
the same ground of reciprocity. Ritchie v. McMullen, 159 U. S. 235, 6 Sup. Ct. 171 (895).
See also Ingenohl v. Olsen, :273 U. S. 541, 47 Sup. Ct. 451 (1927), where a decision of the
supreme court of the Philippine Islands was reversed for refusal to enforce a judgment of
the supreme court of the British colony of Hongkong, which was rendered "after a fair trial
by a court having jurisdiction of the parties." In (1897) FOREIGN. RtMAIoNs OF THE UNITED
STATES 7-8, will be found a three-cornered correspondence between the. State Department,
the Austro-Hungarian Legation, and the governor of Pennsylvania, in which the last named
asserts that "under the laws of Pennsylvania the judgment of a court of competent jurisdic-
tion in Croatia would be respected to the extent of permitting such judgment to be sued
upon in the courts of Pennsylvania ... " Stowell, op cit. supra note I, at 254-5. Another
instance of international cooperation in the judicial field is furnished by "letters rogatory."
"When letters rogatory are addressed from any court of a foreign country to any dis-
trict court of the United States, a commissioner of such district court designated by said
court to make the examination of the witnesses mentioned in said letters, shall have power to
compel the witnesses to appear and depose in the same manner as witnesses may be compelled
to appear and testify in'courts," 28 U. S. C. A., supra note 11, § 653. Some of the states
have similar laws. See 2 MooRE, DIGEsT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (i9o6) io8-9.
